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HomeMy WebLinkAbout8/13/2003MINUTES OF THE CITY OF DIAMOND BAR ADJOURNED REGULAR MEETING OF THE PLANNING COMMI SION AUGUST 13, 2003 CALL TO ORDER: Chairman Tye called the Adjourned Regular meeting to order at 5:30 p.m. at City (Hall, Conference Room B, 21825 East Copley Drive, Diamond Bar, California 9 765. 1. ROLL CALL: Present: Chairman Steve Tye, Vice Chairman Dan I Nolan,and Commissioners Steve Nelson, Joe Ruzicka and Jack Ta ka. Also present: James DeStefano, Deputy City Manager; Mike Jenkins, City Attorney; Linda Smith, Development Services Assistant, and Stella Marquez, Administrative Assistant. 2. MATTERS FROM THE AUDIENCEIPUBLIC COMMENTS: 3. SIGN ORDINANCE. DCM/DeStefano explained that tonight's meeting was scheduled to discuss ce tain issues with CA/Jenkins, one being the provision for the amount of English that would be required or appropriate on signs and two, standards for m dificatioto the political signs. C/Ruzicka felt strongly about commercial signs because he has received input from so many residents. He expressed his belief that the ability toco-exist in a framework of cultural diversity would be destroyed if citizens could not read and understand each other. Signs are the first step toward that mutual u derstan ing. Once signs are created that only a certain segment of the population an read nd understanding will undermine that framework. He believed Me Planping Commission should exercise its unique and influential position with thi 1, City COL ncil by forwarding a report. that conveys the importance of retaining t ie "common language bond" in the community. In his opinion, more important than percent es is the City's obligation and responsibility to provide for the public nee . Chair/Tye concurred. His children attended public school in which 15 diffe languages were spoken., This City would have difficulty administering percente absent a common standard. Perhaps signage could be one issue and there c+ still be an aspect of expression to convey a message whether it is thro advertising, etc. He would like to maintain a community of country livin rathert a community with the look of Rowland Heights, AUGUST 13, 2003 Page 2 PLANNING COMMISSION C/Tanaka concurred. As he travels through parts of other cities he is unable to determine what kind of business exists behind certain signs. He likes the direction taken by City Council with respect to signage. C/Nelson felt the concern was about Chinese characters. He asked himself if he would feel the same way about Spanish, Russian or Czech signage. Diamond Bar does not want to appear that it is fragmented. It does not set a good precedent and he felt the same way about English only in schools. He felt it was important that people could pursue and remain proud of their ethnic and cultural backgrounds and that the issue of signage has nothing to do with suppression of any particular group but to show that Diamond Bar is united. C/Ruzicka asked why if that were true would the aviation community throughout the world use English -only? C/Nelson asked if the City could vote for English -only signs? CA/Jenkins stated that the People could not adopt an unconstitutional law. VC/Nolan said that everything the other Commissioners have talked about is a very "slippery slope." To him it is easier to craft where signs go than to determine what can be said on signs. What he took from the background information was that cities could not regulate what signs say. CA/Jenkins thanked the Commissioners for adjusting their schedules to fit his commitments. This issue came up in 1998. At that time he advised the City Council that they could not, constitutionally, prevent businesses from placing on their business sign, other language and/or characters. He said that he felt confident that the City had a compelling interest in requiring businesses to at least identify themselves by having their name or type of business in English characters for public safety reasons. As a result, the fire department and code enforcement would know the nature of the business and could identify that business in the event of an emergency. In fact, as a direct result of that, the code currently provides that "each business must provide identification signage in English characters not less than 4 inches in height. All commercial businesses shall contain the address or unit number or letter of the occupant. Units shall be in English alphabet. Address numbers shall be in Arabic numerals. All letters and numerals shall be provided in digits which are visible from the adjacent street or parking lot drive aisle. "That is what he considered to be a legitimate and compelling interest that was served by an ordinance that requires certain basic information to be English characters. F-1 1 LJ AUGUST 13, 2003 Page 3 PLANNING CA/Jenkins provided legal analysis and cited constitutional law regarding First Amendment Rights to Freedom of Speech. C/Ruzicka said that according to information he received, commercial speech iE the least protected form of speech. CA/Jenkins said that the informatio provided to C/Ruzicka was not correct. CA/Jenkins said that in fact, commercial speech is accorded a very high degree of protection. "To be valid an ordinance that restricts commercial speech that concerns lawful activity and is not misleading the regulation must seek to implement a substantial government interest. It must directly advance that interest and it niust reach no further than necessary to accomplish the given objective. "Also, it i the law that regulation of speech may not be content based. Wecan my regulate speech with reference to time, place and manner— not content.7 CA/Jenkins said that if cities were to disallow non-English characters, whe her Chinese or Russian, and also disallow words in foreign language, businesses s uch as Del Taco, .EI Pollo Loco and other businesses with names in foreign langua s - most particularly Spanish -become verboten. So now we're telling ma orfranch ses that they have to change their names to English because we only want to see English on our signs. This is a complicated problem and the worst thing we call do is venture into this morass of sign law and First Amendment litigation. In most of the cases where these types of ordinances are challenged, cities lose. He cited the 1998 case Asian American Business Group v. City of Pomona. This case was decided by United States District Court in the Central District of Califo nia. It has never been overruled. It is published law. It is good law. The case involy d a challenge to an ordinance passed by a neighboring city, the City of Pomonc, . It required that 50 percent of the sign area be devoted to English alphabetical characters. The ordinance was challenged and the Court found that t ie ordinance was unconstitutional on three distinct grounds: 1) That the city faile to meet the burden of having a compelling state interest and having the ordin ce narrowly drawn to advance that interest. The interest that was cited by he city was "identification of the business." The Court said it was a legitimate business but ou do not have to require 50 percent of the sign in order to advance that interest. , (ou could require that the name and address be in English lettering withoL t it necessarily being 50 percent and it would still be visible from the str et and to fire and police personnel and it would serve your legitimate interest. Foo note; it is not the interest that you are asserting 2) The Court relies on a seco ld grouni I to invalidate the ordinance, and that is, that it discriminates on the bas s of natic nal origin. Discrimination on the basis of national origin violates the contitution. he Court says that speech/language, is an important part of and flows Worn natic nal AUGUST 13, 2003 Page 4 PLANNING COMMISSION origin. "People expressing themselves in their own language" is part of who they are and where they're from. When we tell people that they cannot speak in their own language we are discriminating against them based on their national origin. He cited two examples; and 3) That it is content based. In order to know whether the sign is legal or illegal you have to read the sign. Unless we have a compelling interest, we cannot regulate content. This case is good law and it has never been overruled. It was decided in the Central District of California and other Courts have cited this case law being good law. As a lawyer, when a client says to him "what is the law" he looks for case law because it is these cases that are decided by Courts that make up the law. And I say, "here is a case that is on all fours." There is no gray. And case law says, this type of ordinance is unconstitutional — not for one or two reasons, but for three reasons. So, I report that to my client. That is the law. If you do not follow the law, there is risk. That is all I do as a lawyer. And you have to be the judge of whether or not you are prepared to accept that risk. Other cities may very well have such ordinances on their books. It would not —� surprise him if there were cities throughout California and the United States that had many unlawful ordinances on their books. Just last March in the election campaign in another city he happens to represent, some enterprising citizen discovered that imbedded in the municipal code was a provision that made it unlawful for unmarried people to have sex in the city. He decided that this was worth talking about. He contacted a few newspapers and it made national headlines. The law was clearly unlawful, pre-empted by state law. It was an invasion of privacy and not enforceable. It has been on the books since 1958.. 1 had never seen it and I have been that city's attorney for over 20 years. Newer cities like Diamond Bar do not have laws that incorporate ancient and archaic laws that have long -since left the books of most cities. There are lots of laws on the books of cities that are there because they were adopted before the law was cleared up or they were adopted without the benefit of legal advice, or, they simply have not been challenged. Whether they are enforced or not is another question. Whether they would withstand scrutiny if they were challenged is yet another question. Curiously and entirely unrelated, city attorneys have an email network and communicate on issues of the day. On any given day he receives 25 to 50 emails from other city attorneys on numerous issues. An attorney with a law firm in Fullerton asked if there were any cities that required commercial signs to be in English -only and are there any problems with such a requirement? The first response came from his partnerto wit: "I do not, but there is a significant First Amendment issue. Unless there is a public healthy, safety or welfare issue 1 see no way for such a ruling. "He cited other emails that read similarly. F.. AUGUST 13, 2003 Page 5 PLANNING CO MISSI N CA/Jenkins spoke about the problem of liability. When a city enacts E, law, the ity Council has "legislative immunity." That means that individual city cou cil members cannot be held liable in damages for violating people's rights by virtue of their voting to enact a law. However, the flip side is that you are not just enacting it law, you are enforcing a law. And so, when you enact a law and then you say to lour staff , go out and enforce that law, you are no ionger protected by legislative immunity. Now all you have is something called "qualified immunity." Legislative immuni is absolute. It means that you cannot get past it. Qualified immunity is ust what hat states— it is qualified. You are only immune from liability for damage for viola ting someoj?-e's constitutional rights if you acted in "good faith." The question of whether or not you act in good faith depends, in part, on whether or not th gre is clearly established law. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a case dealing with an ordinance that it found to be unconstitutional stated "here, the city of icials are not entitled to qualified immunity. For over 50 years it has been clearly established that a licensing scheme is impermissible if it allows officials unfettered discretion to impose prior restraints on speech. Because the city officials, in attempting to enforce the ordinance, violated clearly established constitutional rights of whi h a reasonable person would have known, they are not entitled to qualified immu lity. "In other words, if a city enacts unconstitutional law and the city has good reas n to know that the law is unconstitutional, an aggrieved party can file a su t for violation of constitutional rights. They sue the city as an entity. The city, as an entity, has no immunities at all. If the law is found to be unconstitutional and to t ave violated someone's constitutional rights, the city is automatically libel. The cit, can be held libel in damages and for attorney's fees. The person may also s ie individual officers of the city including Commissioners, Council Members, DCM/E eStefano his code enforcement officer, and whoever else is out there enforcing an unconstitutional law. This case says that if everyone involved had good reaso 1 to know that the law was unconstitutional you have no "qualified immunity. "You cannot defend by saying "I thought it was valid -- I thought it was constituti al. "You are personally "on the hook" for damages. The city is not in a positio i to compensate or reimburse you for damages that are imposed againstyou. Plair tiffs cannot recover punitive damages against cities. Cities are immune from pun tive damages. Punitive damages are awarded when a person is found to be actino in bad faith or with malice. Punitive damages can be awarded against individ als, even if they are city officials. Punitive damage awards would b paid o of individual pockets if found libel for constitutional rights. Why do I emphasize thi so strongly? Because there is risk and risk analysis involved. And the question is ho wants to take that risk? If this were a questionable case and there weren't a se directly on -point decided right here in the Central District of California— if the w 1 AUGUST 13, 2003 Page 6 PLANNING COMMISSION were fuzzy, I would tell you. I do not believe the law is fuzzy. and I tell you that there is risk because it is not just the city's money we're talking about, it is the potential for personal liability. CA/Jenkins returned to the issue of his earlier footnote. Even if the City set aside the national origin discrimination problem and put aside the content regulation problem, is there a legitimate governmental interest? The standard is that the City must seek to implement a substantial governmental interest. To the extent that this City has content -based regulation, the interest must be a "compelling" interest. Are there any cases that suggest that this interest — this goal that you have put forth, is, as a legal matter, a compelling governmental interest? His sense is that when you are controlling your own employees or your own workplace there may be interests that are substantial. What is this City's interest in a government in assuring uniformity of speech? He said he had the sense from his passion about the subject that C/Ruzicka felt it was compelling and substantial that the City should have a community that in effect speaks with, if not one voice, in one language. He was not aware of any case that would say that that is compelling. Additionally, the Pomona case and other cases suggest that an equally compelling aspect of this country's - - citizens respect diversity of the population. While C/Ruzicka respects the diversity of the population and wants it to speak in one voice, there is an equal argument that suggests that one respects the diversity of the population by allowing people to speak in their own languages. C/Ruzicka said he was not trying to say he wanted everyone to speak with one voice. He was saying that when we speak to each other in the form of commercial signs we ought to speak in one language, or as close to it as we possibly can. That's what makes this City the great City that it is — because there is so much respect for culture, race, national origin —that we attempt to honor and respect all of those things. That's why he attempted to emphasize that this City would encourage fragmentation if we segmented. the population by allowing the kinds of signs that speak to only one segment of the population. CA/Jenkins said he understood C/Ruzicka's message. Without making value judgments, it is a sociological issue-- would it meet the test of being a compelling state interest so as to override those precious First Amendment rights? C/Ruzicka stated that he did not realize the risk was so great. Unless he was absolutely assured that Diamond Bar had a compelling interest he would not push anything that would put the City or its employees and residents at that great of a risk. He wondered if there was something that could be done that exceeded staff's report to communicate with residents and could the state and the constitution 1 AUGUST 13, 2003 Page 7 PLANNING COMMISSI recognize that the City was attempting alleviate anguished feelings among and between culturally diverse ethnic groups as well as, minimize socialproblems? CA/Jenkins said the City could certainly consider doing something beyond what it already does. He asked if C/Ruzicka had any ideas. He pointed out that it is. an area that has a lot of land mines. There are many that would, for example, take an opposite point of view — people who would say, "go to Chinatown go to L ittle Tokyo— go to Little Saigon, etc. One can go to areas of cities in South am Califc,nia that have character all their own that demonstrate the diversity of OL r populal on, that this is a country that draws people from all parts of the world ind accommodates them by allowing free expression based on their own culture. There are many different points of view about what is best for our comm pities, What brings us together and what makes our communities desirable places to live. Bottom line, the question is what is constitutional and what is not based on the standard. He invited the Commissioners to offer some additional suggestions. He reminded them that the City does require businesses to be identified in Englis . Chair/Tye asked why someone would not challenge the City's curren� requirerr�ent for 4" English character letters? CA/Jenkins explained that the City determined four inches was the minimum height that allowed police and fire personnel to identify the business. In his judgment, the Court would uphold that it was a reasonable determination. Chair/Tye asked how it would infringe on freedom of speech rights to require a 24 - inch channel sign to have 15 inches devoted to English characters and six inc es devoted to whatever language and characters the business owner wanted to us a to communicate? How would reversal of today's code infringe on speech? CA/Jenkins responded "because our law has to advance our interest which is identification of the business. Chair/Tye asked what if his interest was the economic well being of his community and cohesiveness about which C/Ruzicka spoke? CA/Jenkins responded that a) he did not believe the Court would find t iat argument compelling enough to justify the incursion on the First Amendment rights of the speaker and b) that the Court would likely find that it was discriminatory basec on national origin. And, it would be an end run around the Pomona case hat says you cannot have a 50/50 rule because you would be relegating their C peech to 50 percent or less of a percent of the sign. If, on the other hand, you s id that if�If ou had a sign of X width you have a minimum of 4 inches. But if you ha a sign Y AUGUST 13, 2003 Page 8 PLANNING COMMISSION width then you must have a minimum of 10 inches, still leaving the rest of the sign for other expression, that is possible. For instance, if you had a standard 14 x 48 - foot billboard and required 4 inch lettering, the rest of the message on the billboard might overpower it. One could certainly argue that 4 inches isn't enough in that situation. However, 4 inches would certainly be enough on the X dimension. Could the ordinance contain "relativity? He believed that it could. DCM/DeStefano asked if the City had the flexibility to base size on public safety wherein public officials were able to say that 4 inch letters was not sufficient and that they needed to be six or eight inches high in order to be clearly seen from the street? CA/Jenkins felt it was possible if evidence was placed in the record. DCM/DeStefano said there were several busirls that resided well away from the street and some were very near the public street. Perhaps there was a method for arriving at a standard that had to do with distance as well. DCM/DeStefano responded to C/Nelson that the minimum standard for monument signs is six inches. C/Nelson pointed out that monument signs are on the street. What was the reason for implementing those standards? DCM/DeStefano explained that the standard was implemented to eliminate the clutter of 10 signs that are all two inches high. Individual signage placement on monument signs is usually negotiated between the property owner and the tenant. VC/Nolan asked if the City could regulate fonts and color to create uniformity throughout the community? CA/Jenkins responded that cities were able to regulate the appearance of a sign with respect to color, font, etc., to achieve some uniformity. Some communities were very restrictive with respect to commercial signage, color of buildings, etc. Some cities have been sued because they attempted to get franchise restaurants to change signage and/or building color, for instance. Cities have a lot of power to try to achieve aesthetic uniformity. VC/Nolan felt that part of the issue was aesthetics. F!, AUGUST 13, 2003 Page 9 PLANNING COMMISSION Chair/Tye asked CA/Jenkins if he felt it would not be defensible from "comp ling interest of the community' if people were not able to identify the ature of the business. CA/Jenkins said that he not only believed it would not be compe ling, he Iso believed it would not be necessarily credible because it is evident that businesses jes, with foreign language signage thrive and that they may enhance economic viability of a community and attract people from other areas. If Diamond Bar attemptEd to support a law with evidence that diversity of language on its signage detracts from tion our economic vitality as a community, there would have to be evidentto prove that claim. VC/Nolan felt that masking those sorts of laws overrides what the C ty is tryi g to accomplish. To Chair/Tye's point on the 50/50,4 -inch rule and public afety iss jes, if it takes 10 strokes of the hammer to put the nail in you don't need a hundred strokes. That's where the 50/50 rule comes in. So instead, we're sug 3esting that it could be hidden under the guise of public safety and make it a 50/50 propos tion when 50/50 is unrealistic. To him it seemed difficult to circumvent the law. If there were a sign about a business that was unfavorable to a majority of the residents they would not do business there and the business would close and go away, If it goes the other way it would mean that the demographics and/or the dynamics o the community were changing. He felt it was difficult to stem the tide based on litigation and code. To him, the best method would be to figure out how to control it thrc ugh aesthetics or size. He felt there was real merit to alienation of people who were not aware of what business was being conducted. That needed to be r medied. He felt that over time, all neighborhoods had transitioned. C/Nelson felt that VC/Nolan had a point. As much as he did notisagree ith Chair/Tye he felt .that country living looked great on a logo but it w s somet ing more or less in the eye of the beholder. Chair/Tye agreed that things were changing. Even as dynamics change, the C y is seeking uniformity and continuity. How is that accomplished? And, if economi s is not a compelling interest, what is a compelling interest that works? CA/Jenkins could not cite a compelling interest that would work in this situationj He felt that there were some things over which municipalities had little control. C/Tanaka suggested that during the City's approval process for sign age that staff and the Chamber could work with businesses to recommend a certain typq of signage that would assist the business owner in reaching all segments of the community. AUGUST 13, 2003 Page 10 PLANNING COMMISSION CA/Jenkins said that the Chamber could play that role far more easily than could a government. The Chamber is a private organization. If they want to provide materials in an attempt to establish a certain business community character, that is exactly within their role. Richard Malooly asked if the Chamber could promote a suggested business standard? CA/Jenkins concurred that it was important for new businesses coming into the community to understand the prevailing sentiment about how they advertise and express themselves. The Chamber's job is to assist business in being healthy, vital and vibrant members of the business community. Chair/Tye felt that in order for the law to change, someone had to step forward and challenge it. C/Ruzicka said he was not interested in placing the City or its employees in a position that invited a lawsuit merely to challenge the law. CA/Jenkins. assured the Commissioners that he would retain C/Ruzicka's well- written memorandum and report back to the City in the event that similar laws were challenged and overturned. B. POLITICAL SIGNS. CA/Jenkins reported that there was good guidance about what was and was not permitted with respect to political signs. Some communities allowed political signs on public property and many communities did not. Cities cannot discriminate or regulate on the basis of content, only on the basis of time, place and manner_ One of the biggest problems with allowing for political signs on public property is that once it is determined that sign can be placed on the public right-of-way and if it conveys a message pertaining to acts, cities are then involved in content regulation. As a municipality, Diamond Bar is a government of "limited" powers. Under the law, the United States is unlike other countries. This is essentially the only Country that is a government of limited powers that respects private and individual rights. We are not in the business of telling people what they believe and what they can and cannot say as long as it is not illegal, misleading or fraudulent. In short, once you open the public right-of-way to signage it becomes very difficult to control what people can put up. You can prohibit signs in the public right-of-way. However, if you do so, you must prohibit all signs in the public right-of-way except for traffic signs. And, you cannot discriminate on the basis of content. Some cities allow for 1 1 AUGUST 13, 2003 Page 11 PLANNING C MMI political signs in the public right-of-way and, in his opinion, those ordinances are always subject to challenge to the extent that cities do not allow a y other signs expressing any other message. Cities that do not allow political signs in the public right-of-way do so pri rily because they think signs in the right-of-way add to clutter, they make a mess, hey are distracting, and they usually don't 'get picked up following an elec ion. Additionally, the signs are not really reflective of public sentiment about the candidate, they are only reflective of the candidate's wealth or willingr ess to devote resources to producing a large number of signs and plastering them about. So, these cities allow signs only on private property and they regulate t ern to make sure they fall within certain parameters. This community has allowed political signs on public property. Dc you wa t to recommend that we want them only on private property and not in th 3 public r ght- of-way? If you do that, you get into issues of how big, how many and low long He referred the Commissioners to his March 1, 2002, memorandum to DC M/DeSte ano called "Political Signs" that accompanied an ordinance he prepared. He reiterated his recommendations if the Commission recommended placeme t of political signs on private property only. For instance, four square feet would probably be the minimum size. The City could regulate height of the sign. H felt that 60 days prior to an election would be the minimum standard. There are a number of cases that held that various different time limits were imper issible. ne case said that 30 days was unconstitutional. Another case citec 45 days as unconstitutional. One case upholds 60. How many days after the election can you require they be removed? There is much more flexibility on this issue ecause fter the election, the signs have no particular First Amendment value because the election is over. Therefore, the City could require removal within 3, , or 10 days. He was asked if the City could require a bond to assure sign removal. That particular question is most often raised when cities allow signs in the public right-of- way. We could say that within a certain number of days of the electior the sign are to be removed. If those signs were on public property, the City could advise the party that the City would remove the signs and bill the individual for the rem 3val cost. Cities cannot require owners to give written consent as a condit on of pla ing signs on private property. However, he did write language that said the City c uld require them to show that the owner consented to placement on their roperty f the sign was in a location that wasn't visible from the house. The City's i terest w s in avoiding sign clutter, avoiding clutter of the rights-of-way by assuring that private property owners know their property is being used for signage. He believed hat was not an issue when the sign was in the front yard and clearly visil e. It wasan issue when signs were placed on hillside slopes near streets and a from the AUGUST 13, 2003 Page 12 PLANNING COMMISSION view of the house. There was also discussion about limiting the number of signs per property. There is case law that says you cannot do that. He felt that in Diamond Bar the City would not have people putting 100 signs on their property. If there are three candidates, there could be three signs in the front yard and three signs in the side yard. Again, the City could impose size limitation so those signs would not create a huge problem. CA/Jenkins reported that the Council brought up an issue recently that he continues to grapple with — the question of political signs in private commercial parking lots. For instance, candidates place their political signs high on a utility pole/light standard. It is private property; it is not a public right-of-way. The private property owner may or may not consent to it but he doesn't want to expend the resources to remove the sign. The Council wanted to know what could be done in that situation. He said he was stili not quite sure what to do about that situation and how to address it in such a way that it would meet the standards set forth by the City. C/Ruzicka had no problem with political signs going up 90 to 120 days ahead of the election. Getting them down after the election and making the City look good again is his only concern. Chair/Tye felt that 30 days was sufficient. He felt the biggest issue was eliminating signs from the public right-of-way. It is unbelievable to him that not allowing signs in the public right-of-way is not an infringement on someone's right to free speech, right of association and right to express constitutionally protected privilege. CA/Jenkins said the Court was very clearthat cities could restrict placement of signs in the public right-of-way as long as cities did not discriminate on the basis of content. Cities could decide that its streets were for pedestrian and vehicular traffic only and that the only signage should be traffic signage. Other signage is a distraction to motorists and clutters up the community. To the contrary, in driving his community that only allows signs on private property during elections he can tell which candidates seem to have the grass roots support because they have more signs in his neighbor's front yards. Signs can easily be placed in the public right-of- way. It doesn't mean anything to him other than it creates blight on the area. One point of view is not favorable over the other. CA/Jenkins pointed out that real estate signs could be prohibited in the public right- of-way. Real estate directional signs could not be prohibited on private property. AUGUST 13, 2003 Page 13 PLANNING CC MMISSI N I 1 Richard Malooly felt it would be difficult to maintain the meridian if it ere filled signs. Certain cities restrict the number of signs. It inhibits his reale tate bush not to be able to put up directional signs. However, it is in the agent's, best int( to remove the sign on Sunday night. CA/Jenkins said that cities that prohibit signs in the public right-of-way would also include open house directional signs. However, cities could not prevent them rom being placed on private property. As a practical matter, most cities do not cond ict a lot of code enforcement between 10:40 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. on Sunday. VC/Nolan felt more signs were ripped from public property than from private property. Chair/Tye reiterated his concern about telling people they could not put signs oil the public right-of-way. C/Ruzicka said he would favor eliminating signs in the public right -o -way. Responding to C/Nelson, CA/Jenkins said that to the extent the City al owed sig is in the public right-of-way it could limit time, place and manner. Chair/Tye asked if the City currently limits time, place and manner. DCM/DeStefano responded that signs were not allowed to be any I rger thaq the largest commercial sign. Therefore, someone could have a 72 square foot sigon private property. On public property, the limit is about 6 square feet� [` CA/Jenkins stated that height limitations do not apply to private parking lots. DCM/DeStefano said the City does not have a height restriction on public p However, signs are not permitted on trees and utility poles, etc. VC/Nolan asked if the municipalities CA/Jenkins represents restrict plitical sig�s in the public right-of-way? CA/Jenkins responded "all signs." C/Nelson asked if cities enforce unequally? CA/Jenkins said he did not know that any of the cities he represented had ro tine code enforcement on Sundays. However, he knew that political sign enforceent was vigorous during elections. AUGUST 13, 2003 Page 14 PLANNING COMMISSION Chair/Tye said he did not want to ban signs from the public right-of-way and he did not feel it should be the direction of the Planning Commission or the City Council. DCM/DeStefano stated this matter would be on the August 26, 2003, Planning Commission agenda for discussion and recommendation to the City Council. The Commissioners thanked CA/Jenkins for his assistance and insight. ADJOURNMENT: The meeting was concluded at 7:45 p.m. ly_S)4mitted, JamYs DeStei Deputy City M Attest: Chairman Meve Tye